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Bail in the State Courts-A Field
Study and Report
Bail practies and procedure8 throughout the country are
far from uniform. In this study information pertaining to
bail obtained in the -recent American Bar Foundation
study on defense of the poor in criminal cases is cate-
gorized and analyzed. Admittedly the obvious disparities
in practices may be partly explained by regional or local
factors. The author argues however that in certain in-
stances these disparities are sufficiently great to raise
serious questions under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the excessive bail provisions of
the eighth amendment, and possibly various state con-
sttutional provisions.
Lee Silverstein*
The recent American Bar Foundation study on defense of the
poor in criminal cases gathered much information about state
court bail practices. The study consisted chiefly of an audit in
1963 of local practices in approximately 800 sample counties
chosen from every state and the District of Columbia.' A docket
study was made of 11,000 felony prosecutions commenced in 1962
in 190 of the sample counties.? The studies revealed wide dispari-
ties in the use of bail tests to determine eligibility for appointed
counsel, in the use of bail schedules for certain crimes, and in the
amounts of bail set for such crimes. The disparities are serious
enough to warrant an inquiry whether either the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment or the prohibition against
excessive bail in the eighth amendment is being violated.8
*Research attorney, American Bar Foundation. The opinions expressed
are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the American
Bar Foundation.
1. See SmvmsmaN, DEnnsE o r PooH fs CR I.AL CAsws iN Aw -
c w STATE CouRTS (1965) for a report of the project. A list of the sample
counties and an explanation of the research methods used may be found
id. at 155-81. The material in this article is drawn chiefly from the answers
obtained to question 10, Form I, id. at 195-96, and from questions 1, 2, 8, 10,
16, 17, 18, and 20, of Form IE, id. at 207-09.
2. Id. at 155-69.
S. See Foote, The Comzing C ,stitutional Cr ii in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
959, 1125, 1126-64 (1965), where additional constitutional questions are raised.
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This article will report the Foundation's findings and recom-
mend certain reforms in present bail practices.
I. PRESENT PRACTICES
The study revealed that a number of courts use a "bail test"
in deciding whether a felony defendant is eligible for court pro-
vided legal assistance. In 21 sample counties, located in 11 states,
release on bail precluded such assistance. In another 40 counties
in 25 states release on bail was a primary, though not the sole,
test of eligibility. To the extent that these practices prevent a
poor person from having counsel, it is doubtful that they meet
constitutional due process and equal protection requirements. 5
This point is discussed further in Part II below.
A. Tim AMouNT oF BAm OmGnA LY SET
The survey showed that the amount of bail for certain crimes
varies greatly among counties within a state as well as between
states. Even allowing for local differences in the cost of living, the
disparities are still great. Table 1 shows the probable bail for a
local resident charged with forgery or issuing a worthless check
and is representative of bail amounts.6
It is hard to explain why many counties greatly exceed the
most typical figure of 1000 dollars, considering the disadvantages
accompanying high bail. As fewer defendants can make bail, the
jail is both more crowded and more costly to operate. Defend-
ants who do make bond have fewer resources remaining to finance
their defense, and the quality of their legal representation may
thus be impaired. Bondsmen and bonding companies have fewer
customers but potentially larger profits on each one. However,
if a customer jumps high bail, the bondsman is liable for a larger
forfeiture. Everyone is disadvantaged by a high bail county - the
defendant, his family, the bondsman, and the public. The practice
of setting high bail suggests two pertinent questions: (1) why is
high bail needed? (9) what constitutes a violation of the eighth
amendment's prohibition against excessive bail?
B. How THE AMouNT oF BAm Is DETEmuvND
The study revealed two systems for setting bail: the magistrate
4. SmvnasTmnw, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107; see generally id. at 106-08.
5. Of. Foote, supra note S, at 1151-64 (suggests equal protection theory of
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S 12 (1956), might be extended to bail).
6. This table is based on material in the Appendix to this article.
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Table 1. Typical bail for forgery or similar crime, 1963
(Figure in parentheses is county population in thousands,
1960 census.)
Allegany, Md. (84), Rock, Wis. (114)
Princess Anne, Va. (77)
Russell, Ala. (46)
Allegheny, Pa. (1628)
Putnam, Mo. (7), Thomas, Ga. (34), Butler, Kan.
(38), Laramie, Wyo. (60), McDowell, W. Va. (71),
Saginaw, Mich. (191), Sedgwick, Kan. (343),
Davidson, Tenn. (400), Summit, Ohio (514), Hen-
nepin, Minn. (843), Harris, Texas (1243), Cook,
In. (5180)
Marion, Ind. (698)
Bristol City, Va. (17), Utah, Utah (107)
500
500 or $1000
750
750 cash or
1000 property
1000
1000 or 1500
1000 cash or
2000 property
Tulsa, Okla. (346) 1000
Piatt, Ill. (15), Kanawha, W. Va. (253) 1500
Henry, Ind. (49), Alachua, Fla. (74), Jefferson,
Colo. (128) 2000
McKenzie, N.D. (7), Kitsap, Wash. (84), Ramsey,
Minn. (4.3), Jackson, Mo. (623), Essex, N.J. (924) 2500
Porter, Ind. (72), Yakima, Wash. (145), Lake, Ind.
(513), King, Wash. (935) 8000
Miller, Mo. (14), Nez Perce, Idaho (27) 5000
to 3000
system and the prosecutor system, depending on the dominant
official. Under the magistrate system the committing magistrate
decides the amount of bail, considering such factors as the crime
charged, the alleged circumstances of the offense, the previous
criminal record of the accused, and whether he has a local resi-
dence or other ties to the community. This system is most often
used where the magistrate has legal training. A bail schedule is
less likely to be used under the magistrate system than under the
prosecutor system, and when it is used, it serves only as a general
guide and is not regularly followed.
Under the prosecutor system the amount of bail is largely, or
even solely, determined by the prosecutor. In some localities bail
is shown on the arrest warrant according to a prearranged sched-
ule. Such schedules are more common for misdemeanors than
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felonies. In other localities the prosecutor or his deputy recom-
mends the amount of bail at the arraignment. This recommenda-
tion is usually followed, especially if the magistrate is a layman.
Where a prosecutor's information replaces an indictment, the
amount of bail may be endorsed on the information or on the
arrest warrant. The prosecutor system affords greater opportunity
for excessive bail, hence the trial court of general criminal juris-
diction should exercise supervision so as to prevent abuse.
C. WHo THE BoNDswmN ARE
Most bondsmen in the large cities are full-time representatives
of surety companies, but in rural areas professional bondsmen are
rarely found. Most rural sureties are relatives, friends, or em-
ployers. In middle-sized communities one finds the big city type
professional bondsman, the rural type personal surety, and, in
addition, the local man with real estate holdings who serves as a
professional bondsman. Personal sureties are occasionally found
in large cities, especially where cash bond is required for mis-
demeanors.
D. THE PRoPoioToN oF DEFmDANTS RELEASED oN BAIL
For purposes of presentation the sample counties7 have been
divided into three population groups: large (over 400,000), medi-
um (100,000 to 400,000), and small (under 100,000). Tables 2 to
4 show the number of cases in the sample from each county, the
percentage of defendants released on bail, and the original amount
of bail.
Table 2 reveals a striking disparity among large counties as to
the percentage of defendants released on bail. (Hereafter each large
county is identified by its chief city, although the data was drawn
from the county as a whole.) The figures range from lows of 25
per cent for Chicago, 29 per cent for Minneapolis, and 30 per cent
for Kansas City, to highs of 62 per cent for Honolulu, 70 per
cent for Louisville, and 86 per cent for Philadelphia. The median
percentage of defendants released on bail for all the large counties
was 47 per cent.
A comparable range of variations was reported for medium and
small counties, with medians of 49 per cent and 39 per cent re-
7. The term "county" includes parishes in Louisiana, judicial districts in
Alaska, independent cities in Virginia, Maryland, and Missouri, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
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spectively. It is quite clear that the variation is much greater
within each of the three classes of counties than from one class to
another. Nevertheless, in a considerable number of small counties
the percentage of defendants released on bail was very low. In 9 of
the 40 counties in this class the proportion was from 7 per cent to
24 per cent, which is below the low of 25 per cent in large
counties and 29 per cent in medium size counties. This finding is
not surprising considering the information contained in Table 1
showing that some of the smallest counties require the highest
bail.
Several factors concur to permit excessive bail in rural coun-
ties. Judicial supervision may be light, especially if the district
judge or circuit judge must divide his energies among several
counties. In almost all states except those in the Southeast, the
rural prosecutor serves only his home county, and is thus in a
position to play a prominent role in setting bail. Moreover, the
committing magistrate is likely to be a lay justice of the peace,
more subject to prosecutor or police influence than would a legally
trained magistrate. Because the number of felony cases in any one
county is usually small, the public is often unaware of the problem.
The relative isolation and provincialism of many rural counties
may also be a factor. Finally, the absence of organized public de-
fender offices may reduce the chances that any particular local
system will be challenged.
Tables 2 to 4 also reveal tremendous variations in the amount
at which bail is set.8 For example, in Chicago 77 per cent of the
defendants had bail set at 5000 dollars or more, including 35 per
cent having bail set at 10,000 dollars or more; while at the other
extreme, in Philadelphia, 83 per cent of the defendants had bail
under 8000 dollars, and only 1 per cent had bail of 5000 dollars or
more. In Los Angeles, where the proportion of defendants released
on bond is near the large county median, 81 per cent of the de-
fendants had bail set at less than 3000 dollars, while 16 per cent
had bail at 3000 dollars or more, including 12 per cent at 5000
dollars or more. These representative examples provide consider-
able evidence to support the common sense notion that the amount
of bail will largely determine the percentage of defendants who
make bail.
However, the figures for medium and small counties do not
8. Percentages in all charts and tables are recorded to the nearest whole
number hence the columns do not always total 100 percent.
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Table 2. Original amount of bail set in felony cases,
large counties, 1962*
Percentage of total defendants by amount of bail set
252 41 0
150 43 0
50 55 0
50 61 6
110 37 0
66 49 14
50 62 2
249 25 0
State, County (city)
Cal., Los Angeles
Cal., San Francisco
Colo., Denver
Conn., Hartford
D.C. (Washington)
Fla., Duval
(Jacksonville)
Hawaii, Honolulu
Ill., Cook (Chicago)
Ind., Marion
(Indianapolis)
Ky., Jefferson
(Louisville)
La., Orleans
(New Orleans)
Mich., Wayne
(Detroit only)
Mich., Wayne (Outside
Detroit) 43 74
Minn., Hennepin
(Minneapolis) 80 29
Mo., Jackson
(Kansas City) 80 30
Mo., St. Louis City 144 40
N.J., Union
(Elizabeth) 78 55
N.Y., New York (part
of New York City) 250 43
N.Y., Erie (Buffalo) 125 52
1 22 58
1 1279.
0 4 60
6 10 41
0 2 69
2 24 43
0 34 50
0 1 11
105 34 0 0 4 44 21 18
103 70 11 18 34 27 0 5
218 56 0 20 22 40 3 7
188 52 1 7 37 41 6 6
24 5 26 32 3 5
1 0 5 53 15 13
0
I-4)
4 7 2 3 2 1
9. I1 1 1 1 0
2 12 12 8 2 0820 2 2 4 0
6 154 190
093
420
2 42 32
5450
1 0 3 0
4 2 1 0
3000
0 0 3 3
0 1 8 5
0 0 53 17 16 8
0 0 82 2 8 3
0 9 37 1 5 0 1 16 3 0
0 8 37 8 8 0 2 36
0 2 30 9 6 3 1 48
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Table 2. (Cont.)
Percentage of total defendants by amount of bail set
10
State, County (city)
Ohio, Cuyahoga
(Cleveland) 145
Ohio, Hamilton
(Cincinnati) 151
Okla., Oklahoma
(Oklahoma City) 79
Ore., Multnomah
(Portland) 80
Pa., Philadelphia 246
R.I., Providence 82
Tenn., Shelby
(Memphis) 64
Texas, Harris
(Houston) 244
Wash., King (Seattle) 148
g4 ocs .11
0, 0C:
09 - 49. 0 eq. a
52 1 1 16 51 4 13
44 0 1 17 70 4 3
37 0 0 0 62 15 10
35 0 0 6 42 25 18
86 0 35 48 0 0 1
37 1 1 9 72 6 6
46 0 29 6 56 0 5
at 0 01474 2 4
least
55#
at 8
least
36ff
8 12 11 36 5
9 1 4 0
1 0 3 0
1 019. 0
6
0
1
2030
1 0 5 0
1 0 19 1
Wis., Milwaukee 110 39 0 4 17 58 1 9 1 0 4 5
Median 47
*Large counties are defined as those having 400,000 or more population in
1960. The following counties ae omitted from this table to save space, but
are included in computing the median: Contra Costa (Richmond) and San
Diego, Cal.; New Haven, Conn.; Macomb, Mich.; Queens, N.Y.; Mont-
gomery (Norristown), Pa. A complete table is available from the author
on request.
tThis may include some cases where no data were available.
j- Based on incomplete data. King County is omitted in computing the
median.
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Table 3. Original amount of bail set in felony cases,
medium counties, 1962"
Percentage of total defendants by amount of bail set
e5
9,;~ 1' C
Ark., Pulaski
(Little Rock) 243 49 29 0 2 49 36 4 6 0
Cal., Tulare
(Dinuba) 168 50 30 0 0 4 63 18 10 2
Colo., Jefferson
(Arvada) 128 20 70 0 0 0 53 32 11 0
Il.,Will(Joliet) 192 20 39 0 0 0 6 11 67 6
Ind.,Elkhartft 107 22 59 0 0 0 29 67 0 0
Iowa, Polk
(Des Moines) 266 79 68 10 3 34 34 13 6 0
Kan., Sedgwick
(Wichita) 343 79 51 0 0 0 64 10 12 9
Mich., Kentitt
(Grand Rapids) 188 20 45 0 5 35 55 0 5 0
Mich., Kenti-
(Grand Rapids) 175 60 49 2 12 24 51 3 2 2
Minn., St. Louis
(Duluth) 232 46 45 4 0 28 52 4 7 2
Nev.,Clark 127 49 49 0 4 18 57 4 6 6
N.H., Hillsboro
(Manchester) 178 46 35 17 10 17 38 0 7 0
N.J., Ocean
(Toms River) 108 50 55 6 2 23 35 0 13 6
N.M., Bernalillo
(Albuquerque) 262 50 58 0 0 6 74 2 10 2
Ohio, Columbiana
(East Liverpool) 107 20 60 5 0 15 60 5 5 10
Okla., Tulsa 346 50 49 0 0 0 63 7 10 2
Tenn., Knox
(Knoxville) 251 67 47 0 3 22 49 12 9 0
i-.
020
002
660
410
0 0
0 0 2
222
020
51 00
260
0 1 0
2 1 0
0 0 0
0 17 0
05is0
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Table 3. (Cont.)
Percentage of total defendants by amount of bail set
0 " 00 0
• -
State, County (city) 05., - N "
4 06 090000
Texas, Travis
(Austin) 212 50 70 0 0 0 80 8 4 4 0 4 0
Utah, SaltLake 3834 3 92 0 0 2 84 2 7 2 0 2 0
Median 49
*Medium counties are defined as those with a population of 101,000 to
400,000 in 1960. The following counties in this group are omitted from the
table to save space, but are included in computing the median: El Paso
(Colorado Springs) and Pueblo, Colo.; Peoria and DuPage (Wheaton), Ill.;
Scott (Davenport), Iowa; Shawnee (Topeka), Kan. A complete table is
available from the author on request.
tThis may include some cases where no data were available.
.tSuperior court
itfeircuit court
support this theory. The four medium sized counties with the
highe t percentage of defendants released on bail were:
% of defendants % of defendants according No
County released on bail to amounts of bail set bail
set
Under $8000 $8000 or more
Salt Lake, Utah 92 86 11 2
Jefferson, Colo. 70 53 48 0
Travis, Texas 70 80 16 4
Polk, Iowa 68 81 19 0
The bail amount figures for Jefferson County do not correspond
with the other counties. A check of census data reveals that me-
dian family income for Jefferson County was 7202 dollars, while
the corresponding figure for the other counties was: Salt Lake,
6265 dollars; Travis, 5058 dollars; and Polk, 6464 dollarsO What
appears to be excessive bail elsewhere may well be reasonable in
Jefferson because of this higher median income.
Applying this same analysis to the four counties in Table 3
9. See U. S. DEP'T OF Coz!,mEcB, CouNTY AND Crr DATA Boon 43, 128,
373, 383 (1962). All figures for median family income in 1959 as reported in the
1960 census. For Anchorage the figure is for the election district rather than
the judicial district, but the population is the same for both.
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Table 4. Original amount of bail set in felony cases,
small counties, 1962*
Percentage of total defendants by original amount of bail set
State, County (city)
Alaska, Anchorage 83 49 72
Ariz., Coconino
(Flagstaff) 42 50 39
Ark., Crittenden
(West Memphis) 47 40 35
Cal., Shasta
(Redding) 59 50 24
Colo., Delta 16 19 11
Ga., Catoosa 21 16 94
Idaho, Ada (Boise) 93 45 36
Ill., Piatt 15 6 60
Ind., Porterif
(Valparaiso) 60 13 45
Iowa, Des Moines
(Burlington) 45 20 35
Kan., Brown 13 14 7
La., Tangipahoa
(Hammond) 59 48 60
Mich., Livingston
(Howell) 38 19 32
Minn., Dakota
(Hastings) 78 19 42
Mo., Jasper (Joplin) 79 50 58
Mo., Putnam 7 12 64
Mont., Cascade
(Great Falls) 73 19 11
Neb., Dodge
(Fremont) 32 20 16
0t
2 0 110 17 12 02 0 1520 0
2 13 33 43 2 7 0
0 3 22 44 3 17 3
0
0
0
0
0
0 642 830
0 5 89 0 5
0 13 63 0 19
2 13 47 2 29
0 0 83 17 0
0 0 85423 0
10 0 25 60 0 0
0 0 0 64 29 7
0 10 88 31 0 0
0 0 5471626
0
0
0
5 21 42 0 26
0 4 69 716
0 092 0 0
6 08558 0 0 0
0 0 s0 40 10 15 5
0 0 15 0
050
0 0 0
0 021 0
0 005
0 5
0 0
0 0
060
0 0 0
0 0 0
080
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Table 4. (Cont.)
Percentage of total defendants by original amount of bail set
State, County (city)
N.H., Merrimack
(Concord)
N.M., Chaves
(Roswell)
N.Y., Otsego
(Oneonta)
Okla., Pontotoc
(Ada)
Ore., Lake
S.D., Minnehaha
(Sioux Falls)
Tenn., Bradley
(Cleveland)
Vt., Rutland
Va., Princess Anne
(Virginia
Beach)
Wis., Douglas
(Superior)
Wyo., Natrona
(Casper)
Median
0- C
g
' 0 0 Q0
68 78 55 6 0 35 53 0 0 0 0 6 0
585083 0 0 26116 8 4 2 6 0
522060 011338 0 17 0 011 0
28 18 72
7 10 40
0 0 6 78 11 0 6 0 0
0 0 10 30 10 30 10 0 10
86 19 62 0 0 5 84 0 0 0 5 5 0
38 18 44 0
47 12 17 0
0 35 53 0 6 6 0 0 0
0 25 50 0 17 0 0 8 0
77 50 47 0 2 24 41 5 7 0 0 20 0
45 19 37 0 5 21 58 0 11 0 0 0 5
50 20 40
39
5 15 30 40 5 0 5 0 0 0
*Small counties are defined as those having a population of 100,000 or less
in 1960. The following counties are omitted from the table to save space,
but are included in computing the median: Bingham (Blackfoot) and Nez
Perce (Lewiston), Idaho; Clarke, Iowa; Butler (El Dorado) and Leaven-
worth, Kan.; Freeborn (Albert Lea), Minn.; Audrain (Mexico) and Putnam,
Mo.; Luna, N.M.; Chittenden (Burlington), Vt.; Floyd, Va.; Albany, Wyo.
A complete table is available from the author on request.
This may include some cases where no data were available.
#Circult court only.
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with the lowest rate of release on bail, the figures were as follows:
% of defendants % of defendants No Median
released according to amounts bail family
County on bail of bail set set income10
Under $3000 $8000 or more
Pulaski, Ark. 29 87 10 2 $4935
Tulare, Cal. 30 69* s0 0 4815
Hillsboro, N.H. 35 82 7 12 5885
Will, Ill. 39 6 90 6 6731
*Includes 2 per cent of defendants released on own recognizance.
In these counties bail is relatively low in all but Will, where
the relatively high bail is perhaps explained by the influence of
adjoining Cook County. Yet in the other counties even the rela-
tively low bail was excessive for two out of three defendants. Not
only are the median family incomes in Pulaski and Tulare Coun-
ties the lowest among the eight counties considered in this popula-
tion group, but most of the individual defendants were probably
below the median. Thus, even 1000 dollars bail may be excessive
if the defendant's resources are so limited that he cannot obtain
a surety."
The figures for the small counties resemble those of the medium
counties; the four small counties with most frequent release on
bail were:
% of defendants % of defendants No Median
released according to amounts bail family
County on bail of bail set set income 12
Under $8000 $3000 or more
Catoosa, Ga. 94 76 19 6 $4995
Anchorage,
Alaska 72 42 54 0 8120
Pontotoc, Okla. 72 84 17 0 3874
Putnam, Mo. 64 92 8 0 2355
10. See id. at 33, 43, 103, 243.
11. As a sheriff from Massachusetts said at -the National Conference on
Bail and Criminal Justice:
High bail, or excessive bail, is the amount of bail that you can't make.
I have been in a situation that happened last year.... I had an 18 year
old boy who did 42 days in jail because he could not post $100 bail. If
you ask what high bail is to that boy, $100 bail is high bail for he could
not meet it.
NATIoNAL CONF E NCE; O BArn ANm CRmuNAL JusTicE, PROcEEnmas 185
(1965).
12. See U. S. DE'T OF CommnRCE, CouTY AN Crry DATA BooK 23, 63,
213, 303 (1962).
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For all of the counties except Anchorage, it appears that low bail
permitted a high rate of release despite relatively low family in-
come. In Anchorage, although bail was considerably higher, the
rate of release was also high, probably because of the extremely
high family income.
For the small counties with the lowest rate of release the figures
were:
% of defendants % of defendants No Median
released according to amounts bail family
County on bail of bail set set income13
Under $3000 $3000 or more
Brown, Kan. 7 64 36 0 $3614
Delta, Colo. 11 94 5 0 3623
Cascade, Mont. 11 94 0 6 6032
Rutland, Vt. 17 75 17 8 4873
For Brown County the low release rate is apparently a combina-
tion of relatively high bail and low income. For Delta and Rutland
Counties the low income is evidently the chief factor. Cascade
County is hardest to explain; even, though bail was fairly low, it
was too high for most of the defendants. Evidently they did not
share in the rather high family income reported for that county.
Besides the amount at which bail is originally set and the
financial resources of the defendant, a third determinant of his
release is the extent to which he can get bail reduced. This factor
is intimately related to the system of providing counsel for the
poor, for only if counsel is provided soon after arrest can he be of
much help in getting bail reduced.14 Table 5 shows extremely wide
variations in change of bail, ranging from lows of zero in Buffalo
and Quincy, and 1 per cent in Newark, to highs of 25 per cent in
Chicago, Cincinnati, and Queens and a surprising 65 per cent in
Kansas City. The median, however, was only 8 per cent. The
figures suggest that at least in those counties above the median
percentage of reductions, the original bail may have been too high.
To the extent this is correct, the table must understate the prob-
lem, since many defendants, especially those without counsel, do
not know of their right to seek a reduction in bail. Counties
reporting a low frequency of bail reduction may nonetheless have
a high bail problem if counsel for indigent persons is not appointed
until after the indictment or information has been filed, which
13. See id. at 43, 123, 223, 383.
14. For survey findings on when counsel is appointed, see SILVERSTEIN, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 75-87, 253-67.
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could be several weeks or months after the date of arrest. Another
factor inhibiting requests for reduction in bail is the use of a "bail
test" to determine eligibility for court provided counsel.' 5
If the number of bail reductions provides at least a rough
measurement of the extent of excessive bail, then Table 6 indicates
that the problem is worse in the middle-sized counties than in the
large counties. In the 26 middle-sized counties bail reduction
figures range from zero to 39 per cent. The median is 13 per cent,
somewhat higher than the 8 per cent median for the large
counties.
Table 5. Change of bail in felony cases, large counties, 1962
No. of cases
where data
State, county (city) available
Cal., Contra Costa
(Richmond) 50
Los Angeles 247
San Diego 102
San Francisco 147
Colo., Denver 50
Conn., Hartford 44
New Haven 49
Fla., Dade (Miami) 197
Hawaii, Honolulu 50
Ill., Cook (Chicago) 245
Ind., Marion
(Indianapolis) 104
Ky., Jefferson
(Louisville) 82
La., Orleans
(New Orleans) 194
Mass., Norfolk
(Quincy) 65
Worcester 89
Mich., Macomb
(Warren) 73
Wayne
(Detroit only) 188
Wayne (Out-
side Detroit) 38
No. of cases
where ball
reduced
6
17
6
8
8
6
2
3
2
62
13
15
39
0
10
% of cases
where bail
reduced
12
7
6
5
16
14
4
24
25
13
18
20
0
26
5
8
16
% of total
defendants re-
leased on bail
46
41
35
43
55
61
52
29
62
25
34
70
56
0
69
47
52
64
15. SMVERSTEI, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107-08.
[Vol. 50:621
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Table 5. (Cont.)
No. of cases No. of cases % of cases % of total
where data where bail where bail defendants re-
State, county (city) available reduced reduced leased on bail
Minn., Hennepin
(Minneapolis) 79 2 3 29
Ramsey (St. Paul) 43 10 23 26
Mo., Jackson
(Kansas City) 72 47 65 30
St. Louis City 132 4 3 40
St. Louis (Clayton) 38 1 3 50
N.J., Essex (Newark) 107 1 1 58
Union (Elizabeth) 73 2 3 55
N.Y., Erie (Buffalo) 124 0 0 52
New York (part
of New York City) 243 56 23 43
Queens (part of
New York City) 79 20 25 47
Ohio, Cuyahoga
(Cleveland) 140 14 10 52
Franklin
(Columbus) 102 10 10 41
Hamilton
(Cincinnati) 147 36 25 44
Summit (Akron) 76 1 1 51
Okla., Oklahoma
(Oklahoma
City) 70 6 9 37
Ore., Multnomah
(Portland) 70 15 21 35
Pa., Montgomery
(Norristown) 132 2 2 49
Philadelphia 101 2 2 86
RI., Providence 76 15 20 37
Tenn., Shelby
(Memphis) 61 2 3 46
Texas, Harris
(Houston) 241 9 4 55 at
least
Wash., King (Seattle) 139 25 18 36 at
least
Wis., Milwaukee 92 5 5 39
Median 8
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Table 6. Change of bail in felony cases, medium counties, 1962*
No. of cases No. of cases % of cases % of total
where data where bail where bail defendants re-
State, county available reduced reduced leased on bail
Ark., Pulaski 46 8 17 29
Cal., Tulare 49 9 18 30
Colo., Jefferson 18 6 33 70
Colo., Pueblo 20 2 10 45
Ill., Peoria 18 4 22 53
Ill., Sangamon 50 1 2 20
Ill., Will 14 1 7 39
Iowa, Scott 52 3 6 60
Kan., Sedgwick 78 16 21 51
iKan., Shawnee 75 29 39 52
Mich., Kentt 20 1 5 49
Mich., Kenttt 59 4 7 45
Minn., St. Louis 43 16 37 45
Nev., Clark 49 10 20 49
N.H., Hillsboro 43 4 9 35
N.J., Camden 64 16 25 79
N.J., Ocean 48 10 21 55
NM., Bernalillo 49 21 48 58
Ohio, Columbiana 20 1 5 60
Tenn., Knox 60 9 15 47
Texas, Travis 48 3 6 70
Utah, Salt Lake 40 7 18 92
Wash., Yakima 43 3 11 no data
Median 13
*The following counties, where no defendants were released on bail, are
omitted from this table to save space, but they are included in computing
the median: El Paso, Co0.; Elkhart (superior court only), Ind.; Cumber-
land, Pa. A complete table is available from the author on request.
tCircuit court
ffSuperior court
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Table 7. Change of bail in felony cases, small counties, 19 62*
No. of cases No. of cases
where data where bail
available reduced
% of cases
where bail
reduced
% of total
defendants re-
leased on bail
Alaska, Anchorage 40 6 15 72
Ariz., Coconino 45 2 4 31
Ark., Crittenden 38 4 11 35
Calif., Shasta 50 7 14 24
Colo., Delta 17 2 12 11
Fla., Jackson 39 1 3 33
Ga., Catoosa 16 1 6 94
Idaho, Ada 45 5 11 36
Idaho, Bingham 21 4 19 48
Idaho, Nez Perce 18 1 6 16
Iowa, Clarke 15 1 7 53
Iowa, Des Moines 19 9 47 35
Kan., Butler 49 3 6 37
Kan., Leavenworth 23 2 9 39
Mich., Livingston 19 3 16 32
Minn., Dakota 19 4 21 42
Minn., Freeborn 19 1 5 42
Mo., Audrain 46 1 2 39
Mont., Cascade 20 1 5 11
Mont., Yellowstone 46 3 28 24
Neb., Dodge 19 1 5 16
N.H., Merrimack 18 1 6 55
N.M., Chaves 49 18 37 33
N.D., Cass 22 3 14 17
N.D., Burleigh 34 3 8 26
Okla., Pontotoc 16 1 6 72
Pa., Wyoming 16 3 19 38
S.D., Minnehaha 18 1 6 62
Tenn., Bradley 15 4 27 44
Tenn., Henry 7 1 14 t
Utah, Cache 16 1 6 65ff
Wash., Kitsap 46 4 9 t
Wis., Douglas 17 3 18 37
Wyo., Albany 19 1 5 20
Wyo., Natrona 20 2 10 40
Median 6
*The following counties, where no defendants were released on bail, are
omitted from this table to save space, but they are included in computing
the median: Union and Washington, Ark.; Porter (circuit court only), Ind.;
State, county
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Brown, Kan.; Allegany, Md.; Luna, N.M.; Otsego, N.Y.; Lake, Ore.; Ft.
Bend and Coma], Texas; Chittenden, Vt.; Bath and Floyd, Va.; Kittitas,
Wash.; Raleigh, W.Va.; Clark, Wis. A complete table is available from the
author on request.
tNo data available.
ftMinimum figure based on incomplete data.
Table 8. Time between arrest and release on bail in felony cases,
large counties, 1962*
Percentage of released defendants by days from arrest to release
o)
State, county (city) .2
Cal., Los Angeles 252
Cal., San Francisco 150
Conn., Hartford 50
Hawaii, Honolulu 50
Ill., Cook 249
Mich., Wayne
(Detroit only) 188
Minn., Hennepin
(Minneapolis) 80
Mo., Jackson
(Kansas City) 80
Mo., St. Louis City 144
N.J., Union
(Elizabeth) 78
N.Y., New York
(part of
New York City) 250
N.Y., Erie (Buffalo) 125
Pa., Montgomery
(Norristown) 136
Tenn., Shelby
(Memphis) 64
Wis., Milwaukee 110
Median
41 15 9
43 1 0
61 0 42
62 25 0
25 0 5
02>g
7 11 21 17 13 5 1
0 0 15 23 37 17 2
4 4 12 15 19 4 0
0 29 21 18 7 0 0
3 3 3 1u35 25 10
52 13 29 27 7 9 11 2 1
29 5 5 11 16 21 32 5 0
30 5 5 0 0 24 29 29 10
40 2 0 0 8 35 21 23 6
47 0 0 811 5 313 5
43 13 14 16 13 15 16 6 6
52 2 5 7 4 9 28 21 19
49 27 11 14 14 11 8 3 8
46 62 7 3 7 7 10 0 3
39 69 0 7 3 10 0 3 0
0 0
5 0
0 0
04
8 0
2 2
*The following counties are omitted from this table to save space but are
included in computing the median: Contra Costa and San Diego, Cal.; New
Haven, Conn.; Queens, N.Y. A complete table is available from the author
on request.
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Table 9. Time between arrest and release on bail in felony cases,
medium counties, 1962
Percentage of released defendants by days from arrest to release
State, county (city)
Ark., Pulaski
(Little Rock)
Colo., Pueblo
(Pueblo)
Ill., Sangamon
(Springfield)
Kan., Shawnee
(Topeka)
Mich., Kent Cire.
(outside Grand
Rapids)
Minn., St. Louis
(Duluth)
Nev., Clark
(Las Vegas)
N.J., Ocean
(Toms River)
N.M., Bernalillo
(Albuquerque)
Okla., Tulsa
S.C., Richland
(Columbia)
Texas, Travis
(Austin)
Va., City of Norfolk
Median
00"oo
t , 0
6 6 19 13 19 6 6 19
50 0 25 13 13 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 50 13 25 0
44 11 6 3 6 11 11 3
20 45 44 11 0 11 11 11 0 11
46 45 5 5 11 16 21 32 5 0
49 49 32 0 5 5 5 14 9 23
50 55 57 0 5 10 5 5 19 0
50 58 11 7 15 19 11 11 7 11
50 49 5 19 10 0 29 24 5 5
80 38 42 4 17 0 8 13 8 4
50 70 53 9 6 16 3 6 3 0
80 13 22 11 0 22 22 22 0 0
32
0 Cd PI
'WC3
0
0 C3
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Table 10. Time between arrest and release on bail in felony cases,
small counties, 1962*
Percentage of released defendants by days from arrest to release
State, county
Ark., Crittenden
Cal., Shasta
Ga., Catoosa
Idaho, Ada
Iowa, Des Moines
Kan., Leavenworth
La., Tangipahoa
Minn., Dakota
Mo., Jasper
Mont., Yellowstone
N.M., Chaves
Pa., Crawford
S.C., Hampton
Tenn., Bradley
Vt., Chittenden
Va., Floyd
Va., Princess Anne
Wis., Douglas
Wyo., Natrona
Median
40 85
50 24
16 94
45 36
20 35
23 39
48 60
19 42
50 58
50 24
50 33
37 22
17 49
18 44
25 28
17 59
50 47
19 37
20 40
73 0 9 0 9 9 0 0 0 0
10 30 10 10 10 10 20 0 0 0
80 13 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 19 19 6 6 6 13 6 0
14 0 0 14 43 14 14 0 0 0
44 11 0 1l 11 22 0 0 0 0
35 12 12 8 15 15 0 4 0
43 0 0 14 29 0 14 0 0 0
14 0 5 14 24 38 5 0 0 0
18 18 9 0 27 18 0 9 0 0
23 23 31 8 8 0 8 0 0 0
63 13 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 13
17 8 38 4 4 4 6 8 4 4
0 43 14 29 14 0 0 0 0 0
29 29 0 14 14 14 0 0 0 0
8 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
922 9 1326 9 9 0 4 0
33 17 17 0 17 0 17 0 0 0
29 14 29 14 0 12 0 0 0 0
29
*The following counties are omitted from this table to save space but are
taken into account in computing the median: Washington, Ark.; Bingham,
Idaho; Freeborn, Minn.; Audrain, Mo.; Orleans, Vt.; Bristol City, Va. A
complete table is available from the author on request.
Table 7 indicates that of the 52 small counties, 17 have no re-
ductions in bail, while another 18 have 2 per cent to 9 per cent.
In the remaining 17 however, the figures range from 10 per cent
to 47 per cent. The median for the small counties is 6 per cent,
but again the table probably understates the high bail problem.
At the time of the survey (1962-63) most small counties did not
provide counsel for indigent defendants until after the indictment
or information was filed. In many counties, counsel was not pro-
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vided until arraignment on the indictment or information. This
is rather late to move for reduction of bail.
Still other factors besides those previously discussed affect the
proportion of defendants who make bail. One of these is the length
of time between arrest and final disposition of the case. The longer
the time interval, the more likely the defendant will be released.
Another factor is the particular practices of the local bonding
agent and his principal. Also release on recognizance or a cash
deposit in lieu of bond greatly affects the percentage of defend-
ants released.16
From data presented in this section we may conclude that high
bail prevents release of a considerable number of defendants in
counties of all sizes. In numbers of defendants affected, the prob-
lem is most acute in large cities, but some of the worst examples
of excessive bail are found in medium and small counties, espe-
cially those located in remote rural areas. The dollar amount of
bail is not the only factor to weigh in determining the existence of
excessive bail; one must also consider the financial resources of
defendants, availability of bail reduction, length of time between
arrest and final disposition, and local bonding and court practices
respecting bail.
E. DoEs TiE AMOUNT OF BAI; DLAy PLEASE?
The time between the date of arrest and the date of release on
bail is shown in Tables 8 through 10. The total and the percent-
age of defendants released on bail is shown for each county, fol-
lowed by a detailed analysis showing the percentage of released
defendants classified by the length of their detention. Again we
find wide disparities within each class of counties. Among the
largest counties detention was shortest in Milwaukee, where 69
per cent of the defendants who made bail were released the day
they were arrested, and in Memphis, where the figure was 62
per cent. By contrast, in Chicago, Elizabeth, and Hartford not a
single defendant was released on the day of arrest, and in San
16. See generafly FnEED & WAL), BAnm in THE UNITE STATES: 1964 56-80;
Hearings on Federal Bail Procedures Before the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965);
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Sub-
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964); Conference on Bail and Indig-
ency, Proceedings, 1965 U. Irz. L.F. 1-56; McCarthy & Wahl, The District
of Columbia Bail Project, 53 GEo. L.J. 675 (1965).
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Francisco only 1 per cent of the defendants who made bail were
released that day.
Comparing Table 8 with Table 2, we find that early release is
associated with relatively low original bail. In Milwaukee bail was
less than 3000 dollars in 79 per cent of the sample cases, and in
Memphis the figure was 91 per cent. At the other end of the scale,
bail of less than 3000 dollars was less frequent: Chicago, 12 per
cent; Elizabeth, 47 per cent; Hartford, 63 per cent; San Francisco,
85 per cent. The results for Milwaukee, Memphis, and Chicago
are consistent with the proposition that low bail speeds release
and high bail delays it. The figures for Hartford and Elizabeth
are equivocal, however, and the one for San Francisco supports
the opposite proposition. Therefore, factors other than the amount
of bail must affect the time of release, at least in some counties.
The most important of these factors is the local system for ad-
ministration of bail, including practices of bondsmen and their
principals. Other factors were discussed above. Tables 9 and 10
show that release on bail occurred considerably earlier in middle-
sized and small counties than in large counties. Among the middle-
sized counties the median figure for release the same day was
32 per cent, and among the small counties, 29 percent, whereas in
large counties it was only 8 per cent. This comparison strongly
suggests that the large volume of cases being handled in metro-
politan courts may itself delay release on bail.
In the medium and small counties there appears to be little
relation between the original amount of bail and delay in release.
The counties with the highest and lowest rates of release on the
date of arrest, were:
% of defendants released % of defendants according No
on day of arrest to amounts of bail set bail
County (from Table 9) (from Table 9) set
Under $8000 $3000 or more
Highest
Ocean, N.J. 57 66 21 1
Travis, Texas 53 80 16 4
Pueblo, Colo. 50 85 10 5
Lowest
St. Louis, Minn. 5 84 1 2
Tulsa, Okla. 5 70 12 17
Pulaski, Ark. 6 87 10 2
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There is no significant difference between the two groups in the
amount at which bail was set.
The results for the small counties were similar to those found
in the medium counties: 17
% of defendants released % of defendants according No
on day of arrest to amounts of bail set bail
County (from Table 10) (from Table 4) set
Under $3000 $8000 or more
Highest
Catoosa, Ga. 80 76 19 6
loyd, Va. 80 88* 0 12
Crittenden, Ark. 73 69 23 8
Lowest
Bradley, Tenn. 0 88 12 0
Princess Anne, Va. 9 67 12 20
Shasta, Cal. 10 48 52 0
*Includes defendants released on own recognizance
Here again there is no significant difference in the amount of
bail between the two groups of counties except that the relatively
high bail in Shasta may have caused some of the delay in that
county.
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the data pre-
sented in this section. Delay in release appears more serious in
large counties than in medium and small ones, although there are
exceptions in each group. The delay in large counties appears to
be caused by a combination of at least two factors - the original
amount of bail and the large volume of cases. In medium and
small counties there is little evidence of any significant relation-
ship between the original amount of bail and the delay in release.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
A. DUE IOCESS - RIGHT TO CouNsEL
The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that due process
includes the right to counsel in serious criminal cases.'8 To the
extent that any of the practices described above interferes with
that right, it may violate the due process clause. The "bail test"
17. Only those counties are included where data was available for both
Tables 10 and 4.
18. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 35 (1968).
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of eligibility for court appointed counsel seems particularly vul-
nerable in this respect. Use of this test conditions the exercise of
one constitutional right on the waiver of another. Making the
right to counsel and the right to meet bail alternative rights
raises a serious constitutional problem. Also, insofar as excessive
bail uses up funds which would otherwise be available to employ
counsel, one's right to counsel may be further impaired. A more
attenuated argument is that the right to counsel includes the
right of the defendant to assist counsel in preparing a defense, and
that by delaying or preventing release, excessive bail interferes
with this right and places the incarcerated defendant at a dis-
advantage solely because of his poverty.
B. DuE PnocEss - ExcEssIvE BAn1
The Supreme Court has not stated whether the excessive bail
provision of the eighth amendment is incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment. In other aspects of criminal procedure, how-
ever, the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions is to apply
federal standards to the states, by incorporating the procedural
guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.
It seems a safe prediction that the excessive bail provision will
be incorporated too. In addition to federal requirements, 49 state
constitutions prohibit excessive bail or declare that it ought not
be required, while 40 states provide all persons a right to bail by
sufficient sureties except for capital offenses where the proof is evi-
dent or the presumption great.'9 There is considerable evidence
that very high bail is often required in many counties. It is to be
hoped that the constitutionality of these high amounts of bail
will soon be judicially determined.
C. EQ-uAL PRoTECTIO
In Gr ffln v. Illinois° the Supreme Court ruled that the equal
protection clause requires the state to provide a trial transcript
or the equivalent to an indigent who wants to appeal his convic-
tion. Absent a transcript his opportunity would not be equal to
that of the appellant who can afford one. More recently the Court
recognized the indigent's right to counsel for the first appeal as a
19. See LEGIsrATIvE DRAFTING RESRCH FUN) OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSrTY,
ILDux DIGE ST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 48 (2d ed. 1959). The only state that
does not -have the excessive bail provision is Illinois, but court decisions there
reach the same result under a "sufficient sureties" provision. People v. Ogilvie
(1964), reported only in 53 ILL. B.J. 683 (1965); People v. Snow, 340 Il. 464,
173 N.E. 8 (1930).
20. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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matter of right.2' Some of the bail practices described above may
violate the expanding equal protection doctrine represented by
these two decisions. The bail test to determine eligibility for court
provided counsel may infringe equal protection by denying coun-
sel to the indigent person whose friend or relative acts as surety,
while granting counsel to the indigent who remains in jail.
A more difficult question is presented by discrepancies in bail
for the same crime from one county to another. In Salsburg v.
Maryland2 the Supreme Court allowed a state legislature to au-
thorize different rules of evidence for gambling prosecutions in
different counties. Should different amounts of bail for similar
cases in different counties be acceptable also? One distinction in
the bail case is the absence of legislation, but this may well be
immaterial. The crucial question in an equal protection case is
whether there is state action, not whether it happens to derive
from legislative or judicial activity. The policy of the Salsburg
decision, as well as earlier decisions on which it relied, is for each
state to have considerable latitude in providing variations in
criminal procedure within different counties. Since the 1954
Salsburg case, however, the Supreme Court has developed a strong
supervision of state criminal cases. Gideon v. Wainwright13 is a
prime example, but there are numerous others.2 4 Perhaps this
strong policy requires sacrificing the Salsburg policy. Whether the
Salsburg doctrine should be followed in the bail case, in view of
these more recent developments, seems questionable. Apart from
the federal constitutional question, wide diversity from county to
county may violate state constitutional provisions relating to civil
rights.&25
MI. RECOMENDATIONS
1. A uniform system of bail administration should be estab-
lished in each state, with greater judicial supervision than pres-
21. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22. 846 U.S. 545 (1954).
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1968).
24. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on defendant's
failure to testify); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (lack of opportunity
for cross-examination at preliminary hearing precludes admissibility at trial of
statement made at preliminary hearing); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)
(what constitutes probable cause for arrest); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) (admissibility of confession obtained after denial of request for
counsel); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (inadequate procedure to
determine voluntariness of confession); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(search and seizure).
25. See LEGS .ATIvE DRAFTNG RESEARCH FuND OF CoLunrsBA UNIvER-
SITY, op. cit. supra note 19, at 98.
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ently exists. If bail schedules are used, the amounts should be
relatively uniform throughout the state, and practice respecting
their use should be as nearly uniform as is feasible. Judicial super-
vision is especially needed in remote rural counties, where some of
the more extreme examples of high bail were reported.
2. Further study and field research are needed at the state and
local level to ascertain current bail practices. This should be a
prime subject for bar associations, judicial councils and confer-
ences, and law school researchers. Alternatives to bail, such as
release on recognizance, should be considered.
3. National and regional conferences on bail administration
and related problems have already been held. Additional meetings
of this kind, proposing concrete programs for the elimination of
excessive bail and for the equalization of bail, should be held in
the future.
BAIL
APPENDIX 1
Information recorded below is taken from Forms 1 and 11 of the
American Bar Foundation survey, as gathered by the state reporters.
All percentages of defendants released refer to felony cases only. Eight
representative states were selected, but data from other states is avail-
able on request from the author. See footnote 1 supra for further infor-
mation about the survey.
STATE AD COUNTY
(city)
New York, Clinton
(Plattsburgh)
New York, Erie
(Buffalo)
New York, New York
BAML PROCEDURES
The magistrate determines the amount of
bail at first arraignment, often on recom-
mendation of district attorney. Magis-
trate will generally ask defendant if he
wishes bail to be set. If property is offered,
defendant is usually told that magistrate
prefers to have bail set in county court.
This tends to encourage waiver of prelimi-
nary examinations. About 60%, to 70%
of defendants who are released have
surety bonds signed by relatives or
friends, 25% make a deposit of cash, etc.,
and 5% are released on own recognizance.
Bail is set by the magistrate at first ar-
raignment, usually upon a recommenda-
tion of the district attorney according to
a schedule. District attorney estimates
that 15% of released defendants employ
professional bondsmen, 60% have a bond
from a relative or friend, 15% deposit
cash, and 10% are released on own recog-
nizance.
Bail is set by the magistrate (criminal
court) at first arraignment. The district
attorney often makes recommendations
which may influence the magistrate's de-
cision. A bail schedule is not used. In
capital cases, or where the victim is near
death, or where the defendant has certain
prior convictions, the criminal court has
no authority to fix bail, but application
must be made to the supreme court. N.Y.
CODE CRMn. PROC. § 552 (1965).
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New York, Otsego
(Oneonta)
Virginia, City of
Bristol
Virginia, City of
Roanoke
Virginia, Henry
Magistrates set bail whenever requested,
not necessarily at first arraignment. The
Oneonta magistrate and 4 of the 48 other
magistrates in the county are lawyers.
The recommendation of the district attor-
ney is usually followed, although no
schedule is used. According to the district
attorney, 4% of those released have bond
from a professional surety, 70% from a
friend or relative, 25% deposit cash, and
1% are released on own recognizance.
The clerk of municipal court, who is not
a lawyer, serves as magistrate during
court hours and sets bail. At other times
the justice of the peace, who is also a lay-
man, performs this function. No bail
schedule is used, but minimum felony
bond is $2,000 property or $1,000 cash.
The municipal judge estimates that 25%
of released defendants have bonds from
professional sureties, 70% have bonds
from relatives or friends, and 5% deposit
cash.
After arrest, the accused is taken to the
docketing office (police headquarters) and
placed in detention. Bail, if desired, is
granted by either a docketing officer (a
policeman who can set only cash bail) or
by a bail commissioner who is a lawyer.
In either instance the amount of bail is
based on a schedule prepared by the mu-
nicipal judge in collaboration with the
commonwealth's attorney and bail com-
missioner. For misdemeanors the amount
ranges from $50 to $500. For felonies the
minimum is $1,000. The bail commis-
sioner estimates that 95% of those re-
leased have a relative or friend as surety.
Justices of peace, who are not lawyers,
usually set bail from a schedule. In very
serious cases they may commit an accused
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Virginia, Princess
Anne (Virginia Beach)
Georgia, Cobb
(Marietta)
Georgia, Fulton
(Atlanta)
Georgia, Thomas
(Thomasville)
to jail pending the recommendations of
the county judge. Typical amounts are:
traffic misdemeanor $750 maximum; ag-
gravated misdemeanor $1,000 maximum;
simple felony $1,000; capital felony $2,500
for white persons or $1,500 for Negroes.
The county judge estimates that of those
released, 40% have professional surety,
40%, have personal surety, and 20% de-
posit cash.
Bail is set by the bail commissioner or a
judge of municipal court. The very gen-
eral rule of thumb is that bail is $1,000 for
a felony with a maximum punishment of
1 to 10 years, and $2,000 if the maximum
is more than 10 years. For lesser felonies
bond is often set at $500. The clerk of
municipal court estimates that 90% of
those released have professional sureties.
A bail schedule is used. Bail for capital
felonies, if bailable, is set at $5,000 or up,
noncapital felonies is $500 to $5,000 de-
pending on the offense. Bail for abandon-
ment is $300 for the first child and $100
for each additional child. Worthless
checks and driving under influence re-
quire bail of $200, and other traffic mis-
demeanors $100. The judge and the solici-
tor general estimate that 75% of defend-
ants are released on professional surety
bond, 24% on bond of a friend or relative
and 1% on own recognizance.
A bail schedule is used. Minimum bail is
$1,000 on noncapital felonies, and up to
$5,000 depending on prior record. If bail is
allowed in capital cases, it is set at a mini-
mum of $10,000. Estimates of source of
bond are similar to Cobb County.
A bail schedule is used. Bail for felonies is
$500 to $1,000 depending on gravity, for
misdemeanors $100 to $200. The judge
1966]
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Ohio, Cuyahoga
(Cleveland)
Ohio, Franklin
(Columbus)
Ohio, Hamilton
(Cincinnati)
Ohio, Pike
Minnesota, Freeborn
(Albert Lea)
estimates that 70% of released defendants
have a bond signed by a relative or friend,
29% employ a professional bondsman,
and 1% are released on own recognizance.
The magistrate sets bail at the first ar-
raignment. No schedule is used. One of
the factors in setting bail is that jail space
is limited.
A bail schedule is used for misdemeanors
but not for felonies. The clerk advises
that 43% of defendants have made bond
in recent years. Of these, 78% employed
a professional surety, 4% had a bond from
a relative or friend, 6% deposited cash,
and 9% were released on own recogni-
zance.
A bail schedule is used. Typical amounts
are robbery $1,000, breaking and entering
$1,000, crimes of violence $1,500 to
$2,500, homicide $5,000 to $10,000. A
docket study shows that 60% of defend-
ants released had professional surety, 20%
had a friend or relative's bond, 10% made
cash deposit, and 10% were released on
own recognizance.
No bail schedule is used, and over half of
those released are released on own recog-
nizance. The balance is evenly divided
between personal sureties and cash de-
posits; only 1% have a professional
surety.
The county attorney recommends the
amount of bail, usually just above what
he feels the defendant can pay. When
there is no defense counsel, the county
attorney's recommendation is usually fol-
lowed by the magistrate. The most impor-
tant factor considered in setting bond is
the number of prior offenses.
BAIL
MNinnesota, Hennepin
(Minneapolis)
Minnesota, Ramsey
(St. Paul)
'innesota, St. Louis
(Duluth)
Texas, Harris
(Houston)
Texas, Kerr
(Kerrville)
Detailed bail schedules are used by the
county attorney's office, which recom-
mends bail to the magistrate. Typical
amounts are: 1st degree assault $5,000,
1st degree burglary $5,000, carnal knowl-
edge (10 yrs. or older) $1,000, carnal
knowledge under 10 yrs. $5,000, 1st degree
forgery $1,000, 1st degree grand larceny
$1,000, 1st degree manslaughter $5,000, 1st
degree murder $10,000, rape $5,000, 1st
degree robbery $5,000. Higher bail is rec-
ommended in aggravated situations or un-
usual circumstances.
A bail schedule is not used, but the county
attorney always asks at least $2,500 for a
felony and $5,000 where the defendant
has a prior conviction. Some judges fol-
low these suggestions, others will grant
lower bail.
A bail schedule is not used. Bail for non-
violent felonies averages $1,000; for
felonies with physical violence it is about
$5,000. Rarely is bail set below $500. The
possibility of fleeing the jurisdiction will
affect the amount of bail. A 1962 survey
in the clerk's office shows that 43% of
defendants were released on surety bond,
12% on the bond of a friend or relative,
23% on deposit of cash, etc., and 23% on
own recognizance.
Standard bail is used for each crime. The
amount for ordinary felonies, e.g., theft or
burglary, is $1,000; for driving while in-
toxicated, $500 to $1,000. The district
clerk's office estimates that 75% to 80%
of felony bonds are by professional bonds-
men.
Bail is set by magistrates, who are not
lawyers, at an amount defendant can
probably make. A justice of the peace and
the district clerk estimate that 90% of
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Texas, Travis
(Austin)
Utah, Cache
(Logan)
Utah, Salt Lake
(Salt Lake City)
Utah, Utah
(Provo)
California,
Riverside
California,
San Diego
those released have bond signed by a rela-
tive or friend.
Bail is set by magistrates, who are not
lawyers. The district clerk says that most
bonds are made by professional bondsmen
and attorneys.
Bail is usually set during the first appear-
ance before the city judge, who is a law-
yer. (It is set at the same time in the other
two Utah counties below.) Although no
schedule is used, bail is $1,000 to $1,500
for most felonies. The district attorney
estimates that 80% of those released have
bonds from professional bonding com-
panies, 15% from a relative or friend, and
5% are released on own recognizance.
The county attorney sets the amount of
bail on the warrant.
For first offenders bail is $1,500 for most
felonies; it is rarely reduced below $500.
A former county attorney estimates that
95% of those released have professional
bondsmen.
For most felonies bail is $1,000 cash bond
or $2,000 property bond. District attorney
estimates that 5% of those released have
bonds from professional sureties, 40%
have bonds from relatives or friends, and
the remainder are released on own recog-
nizance.
There is no fixed bail schedule but three
standard bails, $1,000, $2,500 and $3,000,
are used. A deputy district attorney rec-
ommends bail at the time of filing a com-
plaint and this recommendation is usually
followed by the magistrate.
Bail schedules are used only for mis-
demeanors; for felonies there is a tacit
understanding as to bail amounts for
particular crimes.
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